讲座题目:Does Aftermarket Monopolization Facilitate Upstream Collusion?

报 告 人:叶光亮(中国人民大学汉青学院 教授)

时      间:2017年6月9日(星期五)上午9:30-11:00

地      点:岭南堂汪道涵会议室

语      言:中文+英文

 

Abstract:

This paper explores the stability of collusion among upstream firms selling to downstream retailers with an aftermarket. Consumer lock-in in this aftermarket has two effects. Firstly, it restricts the size of the aftermarket, which a deviating firm can capture from its rivals. Secondly, it limits the severity of punishments that act as a threat against deviation. We show that the second effect dominates the first one and thus collusion is less stable. Our results are robust when upstream firms supply parts using two-part tariffs or when the downstream aftermarket is asymmetric, with a downstream firm selling a generic substitute.

 

报告人简介:

      叶光亮,男,浙江苍南人,中国人民大学教授、博士生导师,反垄断与竞争政策研究所(ACPC)所长。毕业于美国威斯康星大学密尔沃基分校,获经济学博士学位。入选“万人计划”青年拔尖人才计划、教育部新世纪优秀人才计划;获霍英东教育基金奖、Emerald卓越引文奖;主持国家自然科学基金、教育部人文社会科学基金等项目。主要研究方向为应用微观经济学、产业组织理论、规制与反垄断、混合寡头垄断等,发表学术论文30余篇;兼任人大复印报刊资料《产业经济》执行编委、全国青联委员。2017年4月,入选教育部2016年度“长江学者奖励计划”青年学者。